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Inclusive Growth under India's Neo-liberal Regime: 
Towards an Exposition 
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Ever since the Eleventh Five Year Plan, India is trying to pursue 
an inclusive growth strategy. There is, however, much vagueness 
with regard to the content and intent of so-called inclusive growth. 
The present paper attempts at exploring the possible content and 
intent of India's inclusive growth and exposes some critical 
inconsistencies underlying it. The paper then traces the source of 
such inconsistencies and shows how such inconsistencies have 
their roots in the country's neo-liberal policies. 
 
 
 
The term inclusive growth and the discourse around it in India have suddenly gained 
currency since the approach paper to the Eleventh Five Year Plan has been titled as 
"Towards Faster and More Inclusive Growth" (GoI, 2006). It advocates that rapid growth 
is essential for the country on two accounts – first, "it is only in a rapidly growing 
economy that we can expect to sufficiently raise the incomes of the mass of our 
population to bring about a general improvement in living conditions"; and second, "rapid 
growth is necessary to generate the resources needed to provide basic services to all" 
(ibid, p.2, emphasis added). While both of these propositions can legitimately be 
questioned for their "unrealistic assumptions" and "problematic theoretical 
underpinnings" (Patnaik, 2006; 2011), it is, nevertheless, required to understand how 
Indian planners have conceptualised the notion of inclusive growth in the plan document 
that followed by examining its broad contours and diverse shades and, more importantly, 
its intent from the political-economy perspective. This paper makes a preliminary attempt 
at attending to the "content" and "intent" of India's inclusive growth strategy, and also 
tries to offer some general observations.   
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The paper begins by tracing and locating the "official" version of inclusive growth and the 
strategy to achieve this, followed by a discussion on its possible interpretations as 
proposed by myriad individuals and agencies. The paper then presents some facts related 
to both the versions viz. the "official" and the other - to show that the strategy of inclusive 
growth pursued in India runs the risk of serious flaws. The paper concludes by hinting at 
the sources of such flaws and the possible neo-liberal intent responsible for them.     
 
Official Version 
It is intriguing, indeed, to note that notwithstanding the overarching fad with the idea of 
inclusive growth, the 11th plan document has remained, somehow, conspicuously obscure 
in terms of its "actual" content. The document recognises the "impressive growth 
performance of Indian economy" and feels that the performance has "overcome the 
cyclicality" and, thus, is on a sustainable path (GoI, 2007: p.1). However, the plan 
document also observes that "a major weakness in the economy is that the growth is not 
perceived as being sufficiently 'inclusive' for many groups, especially Scheduled Castes 
(SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs), and minorities". It is further admitted that "gender 
inequality also remains a pervasive problem" and "some of the structural changes taking 
place have an adverse effect on women" (ibid: p1). The document, therefore, candidly 
confesses that despite commendable growth performances, there is lack of inclusiveness 
on several dimensions; and, hence, aims at making the growth "more inclusive".  
 
Notwithstanding a complete chapter on inclusive growth in the plan document, no 
"specific definition" is provided as to what constitutes so-called "inclusive growth" as 
such. One can, nevertheless, trace likely elements of inclusion in the plan document and 
possibly bind them together to obtain the broad contour and vision of the official meaning 
of the term. The chapter talks of, inter alia, "broad-based improvement in quality of life of 
the people, especially the poor, SC/ST and other backward castes (OBC), minority and 
women" (ibid: p.2). It then refers to inclusive growth as "process which yields broad-
based benefits and ensures equality of opportunity for all" (ibid: p.2). The basket of 
"benefits" and "opportunities", it seems, includes poverty reduction, employment 
creation, better access to essential services like education and health, improved 
connectivity, enhanced opportunity for upward mobility to all sections and above all good 
governance. It is not difficult to see that central to this vision is the acknowledgement that 
growth "should not be treated as an end in itself, but only as a means to an end" (ibid: 
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p.23). This is best done, according to the plan document, by adopting monitorable targets 
which would reflect "multi-dimensional economic and social objectives of inclusive 
growth" (ibid: p.23). The plan, therefore, identifies 27 monitorable targets in its pursuit 
for inclusive growth in the country as a whole, and 13 more to monitor the progress of 
inclusive growth at the state level. The 27 monitorable targets, so proposed, are classified 
into six categories viz. income and poverty, education, health, women and children, 
infrastructure, and environment. The, strategy outlined, accordingly, is to "bridge the 
divides" or "redress inequality" across various dimensions – spatial, gender, caste and 
category; the idea behind is that more the gap is reduced, more is the inclusion achieved.   
 
The 12th plan approach also maintains similar position regarding the idea of inclusive 
growth. The proposed approach paper of the 12th plan retains the objective of 
"accelerated and more inclusive growth" for the period 2012-2017. It seems that the 
planning commission continues to be concerned with the "multidimensionality of 
inclusion" and tries to evaluate achievements of 11th plan in terms of poverty reduction, 
agricultural growth, access to basic services, gap between the marginal communities and 
the rest, inequality in consumption so on (Ahluwalia, 2011).  
 
Very recently, the Economic Survey 2010-11 has provided interesting "micro-foundations 
of inclusive growth" (p.21). It has echoed almost the same concerns stated above and 
reiterated that in order that growth becomes inclusive, its "gains" were to be shared 
"widely" (p.22). It has tried to articulate a "sharper form" of "gains" in terms of the 
"progress of the poorest segment, for instance, bottom 20 percent of population". It has 
been postulated that if the per capita income of the bottom quintile is growing faster, then 
the growth process necessarily has to be inclusive. The Survey, further, has declared that 
the policy discussions in the country though do not "explicitly refer to", but are, in fact, 
"inspired by" this idea of "inclusive growth" (p.22).  
 
It is important here to recall that the 11th plan document categorically mentioned that the 
kind of inclusive growth which is envisaged by the planners requires an "environment" 
wherein "the economy is much more integrated into the global economy". The "micro-
economic foundations" offered necessitates such "environment" to have an "enabling 
government". The projected idea of an enabling state is that "it does not try to directly 
deliver to citizens everything they need". Instead, it creates an "enabling ethos for the 
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market so that individual enterprise can flourish and citizens can mutually cater to the 
needs of one another. An enabling state is mandated to step in to help only those who do 
not manage to do well for themselves (Economic Survey 2010-11, p. 23). The departure 
in the statecraft in this new policy regime is underlined by the important fact that when in 
doubt regarding any voluntary exchange or transaction, an enabling state simply does not 
act, whereas, earlier the interventionist state used to prevent it (ibid: p24).    
     
We may, therefore, summarise the "official version" of the inclusive growth and its 
strategy this way: inclusive growth is a rather amorphous concept in India encompassing 
almost every single perspective, attribute and dimension. In fact, it is a curious blend of 
diverse stances, mostly opaque and arbitrary. It is, somehow, based on the assumption of 
positive growth elasticity of poverty. It is generally concerned with the multi-dimensional 
divides (or inequalities) in the society which needs to be bridged by targeted public 
spending. This, in turn, calls for constantly increasing government resources which can 
come only through faster growth. In order that such faster growth is realised, the state 
must behave as an enabling state and economy needs to be integrated into world 
economy. The simple logic of this strategy is allowing the growth to take its own course, 
and if it creates divides, then the state should try bridging them via targeted subventions 
with the belief that resources required would be generated by the growth process itself. 
How this official understanding of inclusive growth seriously lacks in perspective and 
clear focus, and so, remains deficient in terms of effective strategy is briefly discussed 
below. 
 
Possible Interpretations 
Academic discussions relating to so-called inclusive growth, in fact, have started during 
the last decade or so with a meteoric rise around 2006 onwards. It is noteworthy that most 
of these discussions emanated, directly or indirectly, from organisations and agencies like 
Asian Development Bank, World Bank, IMF and UNDP (Klasen, 2010; Datt and 
Ravallian, 2009; Rauniyar and Kanbur, 2009; Habito, 2009; Ali and Son, 2007; Mody, 
2005). There are, however, individual scholars as well, debating the issue of inclusive 
growth (Thorat, 2011; Datta, 2010; Suryanarayana, 2008; Bhalla, 2007). Major 
approaches to interpreting inclusive growth presented by this wide array of literature can 
be summed up as under: 
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The economic growth, technically, refers to increase in output (i.e. total production of 
goods and services) and/or income (when measured in money value). Notwithstanding the 
constricted scope of this well-known definition, it implies that inclusive growth is a sub-
set of it since not all growth episodes are inclusive. Characterisation of the qualifying 
sub-set has been attempted from two perspectives – one from the process involved in the 
growth and the other is the outcome thereof. Although entwined, one needs to distinguish 
these for their specific policy implications; something seems to be missing in the official 
understanding of the term.       
 
Inclusive growth, from the process point of view, requires greater employment of inputs 
in the growth process. Obviously, growth is possible even without augmenting 
employment, provided productivity improves, but such process clearly does not qualify as 
inclusive. In a limited sense inclusive growth resembles broad-based growth as the 
planning commission maintains, but, in reality, goes beyond it. The term "inclusive" 
carries with it a notion of non-discrimination, which broad-based growth does not take 
into account. This has, evidently, immediate policy implication for affirmative actions. 
This also entails "equality of opportunity" in terms of employment or productive 
participation by different sections of people.  
 
Aligned to this, idea of "social opportunity function", similar to that of social welfare 
function, has been offered for examining inclusiveness (Ali and Son, 2007). It is argued, 
social opportunity function depends on two things – average opportunity available to the 
population and how opportunities are shared by the population. Maximisation of the 
social opportunity function should produce maximum inclusiveness such that greater 
weights are attached to opportunities enjoyed by the disadvantaged. This simply means 
that if the opportunity enjoyed by an individual is transferred to a relatively 
disadvantaged person then social opportunity must increase, thus making growth more 
inclusive. This idea, in fact, is found to be akin to that of Bonferroni developed as early as 
1930 (Silber and Son, 2010).   
 
Looking at the outcome perspective, inclusive growth will imply that the "growth" 
benefits many people. Now benefit of growth can come in array of possibilities including 
more income and/or more opportunities. This option is closer to the concept of pro-poor 
growth. In absolute sense, pro-poor growth refers to increase in income of the poor, while 
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in relative sense it refers to faster growth of income of the poor. The latter is, therefore, 
accompanied by declining income inequality. It is important to realise that both should 
invoke different policy responses – interpreted in absolute term the strategy would be 
simply poverty reduction, construed in relative term the strategy would be redressing 
inequality. Most importantly, the second also allows income of the non-poor to grow 
which is vital in maintaining aggregate demand providing growth impetus to the 
economy. The perspectives of inclusive growth presented here can be extended to cover 
non-income aspects too, and if so done, the notion will transcend to that of inclusive 
development. We, however, limit ourselves to the former only.   
 
It should, thus, be clear that the "official" notion of inclusive growth is a mixed-bag, 
referring to all sorts of views ranging from "broad-based" to "pro-poor" and, therefore, 
lacks clear perspective. It may also be seen that attributes like income and opportunity can 
be attended to both from the "process" and "outcome" standpoints, each requiring 
differential policy treatments. In absence of any explicit perspective, results derived by 
sort of "confused" strategy are bound to be underprovided.   
 
Recent Empirics on Inclusion  
Let us now turn to some facts. Most remarkable "achievement" of India's growth 
performance has been "projected" as the secular decline in the country's overall poverty 
rates. As per the planning commission's estimate India's poverty has gone down 
significantly from 45.3 percent to 37.2 percent during 1993-94 and 2004-05 (by 
Tendulkar method). The tentative estimate for 2009-2010 has been put at 32.2 percent. 
Going by the pro-poor growth perspective, in absolute sense, India's growth can be surely 
termed as "inclusive". However, multi-dimensional divides in poverty rates make this 
decline non-inclusive still. For instances, as per the 2004-05 data rural poverty is about 
one and half times of the urban poverty (data for 2009-10 still under processing). Divides 
are also prominent across socio-religious groups – among ST it is 44.7, among SC 37.1, 
among Hindus 28 and among Muslims 33 percent (Thorat, 2011). Nevertheless, gaps are 
believed to be narrowing apparently indicating greater inclusiveness. For example, the 
rural-urban poverty gap has reduced from 18.3 in 1993-94 to 16.1 in 2004-05.  
 
Along with poverty, one may also pick-up couple of "monitorable" indicators, which 
mostly relate to outcome rather than the process of growth to examine the extent of 
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inclusiveness. For instance, let us take indicators of Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) and 
Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER), say, at upper-primary level. It will be seen that the IMR 
has declined from 58 to 50 during 2004-2009. Notwithstanding, there exists an evident 
gulf between rural and urban as rural IMR is 55 and urban IMR is 34 in 2009. In 2004, 
the rural IMR was 64 while urban IMR was 40. It is popularly viewed that the rural urban 
gap, therefore, has reduced from 24 to 21. Needless to point out, through, gaps also exist 
along other dimensions such as gender or social groups. Coming to the GER, one would 
find that in 2004-05 the rate was 69.9, which has risen to 77.5 in 2008. Nevertheless, 
clear gap is seen among boys and girls – rate for boys is 77.0 and that for girls is 69.5 in 
2008 which was 74.3 and 65.1 respectively in 2004-05.  
 
The data on employment, on the other hand, depicts a disastrous picture. Recently 
released 66th round NSSO data on employment shows clear deceleration in aggregate 
employment between 2004-05 and 2009-10, a period proclaimed as a period of inclusive 
growth. The first point that is revealed by the data is that there is virtually no increase in 
employment opportunities during the period. The total employment has grown during the 
period just by about half a million against the promise of 58 million during the 11th plan 
period. The rate of employment growth has been mere 0.83 percent against the previous 
rate of 2.66 percent during 1999-2000 to 2004-05. The most strikingly, the deceleration is 
all pervasive and in case of females, employment the rate, in fact, is negative, both in 
rural and urban areas. The deceleration is prominent in non-agricultural activities. The 
result portrays a situation of so-called "jobless growth", and, placed in an awkward 
situation, the government has come down heavily on the NSSO alleging it of adopting 
"faulty methodology".   
 
Scholars have pointed out two possible explanations for the present employment scenario 
in the country - first, it is held that the observed deceleration is partly due to educational 
preference of youths belonging to 15 to 24 age groups (Ghosh and Chandrasekhar, 2011). 
Second, the slow down in the labour market is due to present recession leading to 
depressing exports, which are mostly women labour oriented (Chowdhury, 2011). There, 
however, also prevails scepticism that the decline in female labour force participation rate 
across all age-groups indicates some fundamentally exclusionary character of present 
growth process against women (ibid: p. 24).  
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It is, thus, obvious that notwithstanding the "positives" in outcome indicators, there is 
hardly any "positive" in the process term in the so-called inclusive growth regime in 
India. Given the fact that labour force was assumed to grow at 1.92 percent during the 
11th plan period, one can easily imagine the employment scenario with meagre 0.8 
percent employment growth during the period. The immediate outcome of this is an ever 
increasing "labour-reserve" in the country, which is left excluded. Situation is predictably 
going to worsen when those within the age group of 15 – 24 will start seeking 
employment after completing education coupled with the constantly increasing labour-
reserve.  
 
How does one reconcile these two opposite trends both supposed to be reflecting the same 
inclusive growth? If on process side the present growth process is exhibiting vividly 
exclusionary character then how come "inclusive features" are generated on the outcome 
front? Very briefly, the sources of this fallacy are given below.  
 
Sources of Fallacy 
The first source of the fallacy lies in the methodology of measuring the so-called 
"inclusiveness" of the outcomes itself. A careful look will reveal that this essentially 
entails measurement of group-differentials. Any measure of evaluating socio-economic 
indicators that compare two sub-groups over two situations should exhibit some 
sensitivity to their levels. Analogous to the "transfer-sensitivity" property of poverty 
indices, any measure of group-differential should also indicate that: "a given hiatus 
between two groups should acquire a greater salience the lower (if failure 
indicator)/higher (if attainment indicator) the level at which the hiatus arises" (Mishra and 
Subramaniam, 2006). A class of measures that satisfies a set of desirable properties has 
been proposed for both failure and success indicators by Nathan and Mishra (2010). The 
following two measures fulfil all the desirable properties (see ibid for details) and hence, 
may be used: 
 
For attainment indicator (i.e. more is better) 
 (Ia – Ib)/(1-Ib/2); and  
For failure indicator (i.e. less is better) 
 1-(Ib/Ia); where a and b are sub-groups, and I is the chosen indicator  
such that, Ib is non-zero 
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Let us now examine the outcome indicators used earlier viz. poverty rate, infant mortality 
rate and the gross enrolment rate. The following is the table of measurements across the 
sub-groups over two different periods.  
 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Indicator (I) 
and Sub-group 
Type of  
Indicator a b a b Differential Differential 
Poverty Rate Failure 50.10 31.80 41.80 25.70 0.365 0.385 
IMR Failure 64.00 40.00 55.00 34.00 0.375 0.382 
GER Success 65.10 74.30 69.50 77.00 0.254 0.200 
 
The results demonstrate that trend is not so "inclusive" as it has been popularly perceived 
and projected. The source of this perceived fallacy lies in extreme reductionism regarding 
the measure of inclusiveness as simple subtraction, which is not at all "level-sensitive" 
and which is unable to distinguish between "success" and "failure" outcomes. As a result, 
more often than not, it simplistically tends to overestimate so-called inclusiveness and 
breeds a false sense of complacency amongst people in general, and amongst those 
around the policy circle. We will see in conclusion how this sense of complacency helps 
in furthering and continuing with the status-quo. 
  
Second source of fallacy relates to the official poverty figures itself. The secular decline 
in poverty has widely been alleged as "doctored". This is simply because proclaimed 
decline in poverty rate is not corroborated by other facts. For instance, growth in 
agriculture, which is the mainstay of about 75 percent of population, has been minimal - 
hovering around paltry 2 percent for a long time, aggregate employment is decelerating as 
shown above, then what could be the possible source of decline in poverty rates. It has 
been held that the decline shown by the Planning Commission is methodologically faulty: 
it updates a “poverty line” by using the Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers 
which only partially covers the consumption basket of the labourers (Patnaik, 2006). 
Moreover, an essentially income poverty estimate based on consumption expenditure 
ignores phenomenon like "dis-savings". Therefore, the poverty, even by official standard, 
it is argued, has been on the rise, or at best has not declined in this so-called high-growth 
period. Once accepted, the two fundamental logics behind the present growth regime – 
reduction in poverty and reduction in unemployment – are completely falsified by facts. 
This is because, as scholars have argued quite emphatically that it is not the magnitude of 
the growth rate, but the nature of it, and hence the regime within which it occurs, that is 
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crucial for addressing poverty and unemployment. This takes us to the third source of 
fallacy. 
 
The third source is contained in the stylised relationship between employment and growth 
and its basic tenets. The stylised theory requires that more labour entering into the 
production function together with the capital stock at a particular point of time should 
produce growth. It typically assumes productivity of labour as datum. It ignores the 
possibility of non-using up of ever increasing "labour reserves", thus, making the process 
vulnerable to an in-built source of inequality. When growth process necessitates 
increasing demand for products which entails production system biased towards 
technology and highly productive labour, the rate of growth of labour demand does not 
necessarily exceed the rate of growth of labour supply. Clearly, linking employment with 
the growth process needs a perspective which must be translated into policy if growth 
process is to beget employment at all. Any growth strategy for India, therefore, if it is to 
address the basic social needs, must be capable of rapidly absorbing the ever expanding 
labour reserves. Herein, lies the need for a growth strategy stimulated by an expansion of 
agriculture, which, in turn, must be based on non-expropriation of the peasantry from land 
(Patnaik, 2011; 2009).  
 
The discussion above highlights the centrality of employment creation to inclusive 
growth strategy in Indian context. The proliferation of low productivity informal or casual 
employment, which has grown in India in recent past during the high growth episodes, 
however, is not the right kind of result. The present strategy of almost "jobless growth" 
cannot be a long term approach to inclusive growth. The approach of bridging the divides 
by increased public spending on wide ranging social sector facilitated by higher growth is 
self-limiting on two counts – first, ever increasing unemployment will ultimately dampen 
the aggregate demand and shove the growth cycle into depression and second, there is a 
limit to public spending as well, which cannot go on for ever. This said, however, the 
kind of growth process obsessively pursued after “so-called” period of neo-liberal reform 
is unlikely to cause employment expansion. It is, therefore, not surprising at all that "skill 
development" rather than "employment creation" is receiving overriding priority in 12th 
plan approach. The crucial role of employment expansion, or more technically, the 
condition of near full-employment, if not absolute full-employment, in making growth 
process “inclusive” can be seen from certain historical facts.  
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Facts from History 
It is both worthwhile and imperative to recount historical experiences of development 
practices worldwide at this point. A careful examination of these experiences would show 
that well-established crisis of capitalism in 1930s had resulted in some sort of "class 
compromise” between "capital and labour" which, in turn, has produced subsequently a 
political-economy organisation now referred to as "embedded liberalism". Central to the 
embedded liberalism was the idea that capital was to be “contained” by state imposed 
precincts. Scholars argue that this kind of embedded liberalism has yielded high rates of 
economic growth in advanced capitalist countries in 1950s and 1960s. Following the 
crisis that occurred in these capitalist countries during 1970s, neo-liberal project offered 
dis-embedding capital as the only panacea. The inherent class character of the neo-liberal 
project has been adequately discussed by David Harvey (2005). He shows in detail the 
conditions under which neo-liberalism emerged victorious over all possible escape-routes. 
The class compromise between capital and labour during 50s and 60s mentioned earlier 
provided grounds in many advanced capitalist countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal for 
communist and socialist forces to emerge strongly. These unique political-economic 
configurations tended to ensure a larger share of economic pie to working class at the 
expense of the shares of the economic elites and ruling classes. For instance, it has been 
shown that in the US, the share of the national income taken by top 1 percent of income 
earners fell from a pre-war high of 16 percent to less than 8 percent by the end of the 
Second World War and stayed close to that level for nearly three decades (Harvey, 2005). 
This could happen basically due to the kind of “tightness” the contemporary labour 
markets of the Europe and the US were subjected to. During the 1950s and 1960s, the 
unemployment rates in the Europe and the US were relatively lower than those of the 70s 
and 80s; Data reveal that during the 1950s and 1960s, unemployment rates in most of the 
European countries has remained as low as 1, 2 or 3 percent which subsequently mounted 
to about 16 percent in the mid 80s (Pissarides, 2003, Aldcroft, 2001). Tempting though, 
discussion on causes of such “tightness” in the labour market is avoided, lest there should 
be a digression from our main focus. It needs to be recognised that peculiar political-
economy configuration referred to above was made possible by the low unemployment 
rates at that point of time or, in other words, by the near full employment condition 
implying thereby that this would not have been possible had there been a high 
unemployment rate as is the case that the Indian economy is witnessing presently, which, 
in fact, was the case even with those countries during 1970s and onwards when 
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unemployment rate had risen enormously and political-economy configuration had 
altered consequently.  
 
These historical facts notwithstanding, it is not difficult to see that while growth rates 
were impressively high, such decline did not matter since absolute size of the income 
share of the richest kept increasing still. But when growth slumped in the 1970s, together 
with falling rate of interest yielding lower dividends from investment, economic elites felt 
threatened. It is, therefore, may be argued that intention of a neo-liberal growth trajectory 
is to re-establish the hegemony of the economic elites and ruling class, usually by both 
acting in connivance. Harvey clearly demonstrates that benefits of revived capital 
accumulation have remained highly skewed under neo-liberal regime across the globe and 
increasing social inequality, thus, has been almost "structural" to the neo-liberal project. 
Evidently, therefore, the notion of inclusive growth within a neo-liberal policy regime 
appears to be an oxymoron, particularly at a time when unemployment rate is evidently 
increasing.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is possible to argue that evident overall bewilderment regarding the idea 
of inclusive growth leading to misspecification of strategy to achieve it is intended to 
buttress neo-liberal reforms and policy in the country. Growing concern over rising 
inequalities on diverse fronts during the post-reform period has started capturing peoples' 
imagination in early 2000s. The culmination is seen during the 2004 general election 
when people rejected the idea of "shining India". Many started arguing that "verdict 2004 
was a vote against neo-liberal economic reforms" (Chandrasekhar, 2004). The impact of 
the election result was felt in the stock market as well. The situation has rung a bell of 
alarm not only domestically but also outside. The Asian Development Bank, for instance, 
constituted a Group of Eminent Persons in its bid to re-structure it for overcoming the 
"new challenges" in "transforming Asia". In March, 2007 the Group submitted its report 
which suggests three basic lines of restructuring – "The New ADB must be much more 
focused, driven by three complementary strategic directions: moving from extensive 
poverty to supporting 'faster and more inclusive growth', from economic growth to 
environmentally sustainable growth, and from a primarily national focus to a regional and 
ultimately global focus" (ADB, 2007: p.1). While articulating importance of inclusive 
growth the Group takes the view: 
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In many countries, rising incomes, while reducing overall poverty, have been 
associated with rising disparities. These disparities, left unchecked, could threaten 
the fragile political consensus for economic reforms, or even political stability. 
Increasingly, political leaders in Asian countries are searching for ways to manage 
this challenge, a challenge arising directly from their success in achieving growth. 
… The solution lies in continuation of pro-growth economic strategies – but with a 
much sharper focus on ensuring that economic opportunities created by growth 
are available to all…. (pp.13-14, emphasis added).  
 
There is no reason to believe that India is an exception to this understanding and 
perception. It is, thus, clear that reference to inclusive growth is an imperative on the part 
of the government to finding a way for managing fragile and threatened political 
consensus to continue with the pro-growth strategy and push forward neo-liberal reforms. 
Obviously, the interest of the neo-liberal state is best served in keeping the concept wide 
open as far as possible so that discourse becomes highly accommodative. It may, 
therefore, be concluded that while the content of India's inclusive growth strategy is 
arguably misplaced, its intent is thoroughly motivated by the interests of the neo-liberal 
state. The fall out noticed, therefore, is hardly surprising.  
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